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Willis: Utilizing Telehealth to Practice Medicine across State Lines: The

UTILIZING TELEHEALTH TO PRACTICE
MEDICINE ACROSS STATE LINES: THE
ENFORCEABILITY OF PHYSICIAN NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS AND NONSOLICITATION CLAUSES
INTRODUCTION
Healthcare delivery has been drastically changed in the United States
as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. 1 As government and health
officials advised individuals to limit face-to-face interactions in an
attempt to slow the spread of the virus, 2 almost all non-urgent in-person
patient visits were cancelled. 3 Telehealth played a crucial role in the
continuance of patient care during the pandemic. 4 Most simply defined,
telehealth allows physicians to conduct appointments with patients over
the phone or through video conferences just as they would during inperson visits. 5 Organizations such as the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention urged physicians and healthcare facilities to implement
widespread telehealth usage. 6 Thus, despite the cancellation of in-person

1. See generally Alex Spanko, Telehealth Claims Spike More than 8,000% Amid Covid-19
Pandemic, Government Waivers, SKILLED NURSING NEWS (July 8, 2020), https://
skillednursingnews.com/2020/07/telehealth-claims-spike-more-than-8000-amid-covid- 19pandemic-government-waivers/ (discussing the increase in telehealth claims at the start of the
pandemic). This study did not include claims for patients that use Medicaid or Medicare services. Id.
2. See e.g., Cal. Exec. Order N-33-20 (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content

/uploads/2020/03/3.19.20-attested-EO-N-33-20-COVID-19-HEALTH-ORDER.pdf

(becoming the

first state to issue a stay at home order, California directs all residents to stay home except for essential
travel and work); N.Y. Exec. Order No. 202.8, (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.govemor.ny.gov/sites
/default/files/atoms/files/EO_202.8.pdf
(mandating that all non-essential workplaces utilize
telecommunication to decrease the number or New York residents outside of the home).
3. See Patient Perspectives on Virtual Care, KYRUUS 2 (2020), https://www.kyruus.com
/hubfs/Whitepapers/Reports

/Kyruus%202020%20Patient%20Perspectives%200n%20Virtual%20Care%20Report.pdf.

&

4. See Letter from Jacqueline Fincher, MD, MACP, Pres., Am. Coll. of Physicians, to Seema
Verma, Adm'r, Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid Serv. (June 4, 2020).
5. See Telehealth Implementation Playbook, AM. MED. ASS'N 1, 10 (2020), https://www.amaassn.org/system/files/2020-04/ama-telehealth-playbook.pdf.
6. See Lisa M. Koonin et. al., Trends in the Use of Telehealth During the Emergence of the
COVID-19 Pandemic - United States, January-March 2020, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
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doctor appointments, physicians and other healthcare providers were able
to continue providing care to many patients by using virtual telehealth
services. 7 Telehealth was also used as a form of triage during the height
of the pandemic as it allowed healthcare providers to perform an initial
8
patient consultation to determine the necessity of seeking further care.
The appeal of telehealth visits, by both patients and physicians, has
raised drastically amidst COVID-19.9 Telehealth is an effective solution
to social-distancing protocols as it allows physicians to continue
providing effective care for many patients.1 0 As a result, the telehealth
industry saw more than an 8,000% increase in claims to private insurers
for medical services provided via telehealth in early 2020 as compared to
claims in 2019.11 A Board Member of the Physicians Foundation opined
that "[w]ith the evolving COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on access
to medical care, there is no better time to help physicians navigate and
implement telemedicine into their practices and enhance their ability to
care for patients." 12 However, the implementation and utilization of
telehealth in the medical field may be impaired by legal boundaries as the
United States shifts out of the pandemic.13
As telehealth continues to grow, 14 the sudden explosion of the
market will exacerbate the legal issues that were of great concern as courts
began addressing telehealth. 15 This note addresses the legal issues that
arise with the inconsistencies between state enforcement of non-compete
16
agreements and non-solicitation clauses for physicians and argues that

PREVENTION 1595 (Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/pdfs/mm6943a3-

H.pdf.
7. Oleg Bestsennyy, et al., Telehealth: A Quarter-Trillion-DollarPost-COVID-19 Reality?,
MCKINSEY & CO. (July 9, 2021), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/healthcare-systems-and-

services/our-insights/telehealth-a-quarter-trillion-dollar-post-covid- l 9-reality#.
8. See Heather M. Jones, What to Expect at Your FirstTelehealth Appointment, SINGLECARE
(Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.singlecare.com/blog/telehealth/.

9. See id.
10. See id.
11. Spanko, supra note 1.
12.
13.
14.
15.

AM. MED. Ass'N, supranote 5, at 5 (quoting a statement made by Dr. Russell Libby, M.D.).
See infra Part I.B.
See Spanko, supra note 1.
See generally J. Kelly Barnes, Comment, Telemedicine: A Conflict of Laws Problem

Waiting to Happen-How Will InterstateandInternationalClaimsBe Decided?,28 HOUSTON J. INT'L
L. 491, 519 (2006) (analyzing the choice-of-law issues that may arise as courts began addressing the
practice of telehealth). Specifically, this comment looked at three "legal situations [that may arise for

physicians practicing telehealth]: (1) a medical malpractice claim . . . (2) a physician licensure claim
where a telemedicine provider is not licensed in the jurisdiction in which the patient is located, and
(3) a federal statutory claim." Id.

16. See infra Part

IIB.-II.
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the current laws are inadequate when applied to physicians practicing
telehealth.1 7 Non-compete agreements and non-solicitation clauses are
subsets of restrictive covenants, and it is very common for employers to
ask employees (physicians) to sign both. 18 For the purposes of this note,
"restrictive covenants" will be used to describe both non-competes and
non-solicitations clauses, unless a designation is specifically stated.
Generally, non-competes are enforced through the rule of reason test
to determine if the restrictions are reasonable as to time, geographic
location, and scope. 19 Telehealth poses a challenge with the geographic
restriction component of restrictive covenants because providers may
practice across state lines creating a large geographic area of practice. 20
This is especially relevant in the wake of COVID-19 as licensing
regulations have been relaxed and waived to increase the usage of
telehealth services. 2 1 Now more than ever, physicians are able to practice
in an almost limitless geographic territory due to relaxed telehealth
regulations. 22
The increased geographic scope of practice for many physicians
practicing telehealth will create issues as courts try to enforce restrictive
covenants. 23 This expanded territory of practice may result in telehealth
employers having business interests in an almost unlimited geographic
location. 24 Because of the uniqueness of the telehealth industry, noncompetes and non-solicitation clauses for physicians practicing telehealth
should be distinguished from typical physician restrictive covenants. 25
See infra Part V.
See David J. Clark, Non-Compete Laws Affecting Health Care Professionalsin Various
U.S. Jurisdictions, NAT'L L. REv. (July 5, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/noncompete-laws-affecting-health-care-professionals-various-us-jurisdictions.
19. See S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Physician Restrictive Covenants: The Neglect of
Incumbent PatientInterests, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 189, 195 (2006). Non-solicitation agreements
are enforced in a similar framework, with slight differences. See infra Part II.F.
20. See e.g., Telemedicine Policies: Board by Board Overview, FED'N OF STATE MED. BDS. 1,
https://www.fsmb.org/siteassets/advocacy/key-issues/telemedicinepolicies bystate.pdf
(last
updated June 2021); A Faster Pathway to Physician Licensure, INTERSTATE MED. LICENSURE
COMPACT, https://www.imlee.org/a-faster-pathway-to-physician-licensure/ (last visited Oct. 10,
17.
18.

2021).
21. See Waiver or Modification ofRequirements Under Section 1135 of the Social SecurityAct,
PUB. HEALTH EMERGENCY (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/healthactions
/section 1135/Pages/covid 19-13March20.aspx.
22. See infra Part I.B.4.

23.

See infra Part II.D.

24.

See Employment-Related Considerationsfor Health Care Providers ProvidingTelehealth

Services Duringthe COVID-19 Pandemic, TANNENBAUM HELPERN- SYRACUSE & HIRSCHTRITT LLP
(July 29, 2020), https://www.thsh.com/publications/employment-related-considerations-for-healthcare-providers-providing-telehealth-services-during-the-covid-19-pandemic.

25. See infra Part II.D.
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There is currently little judicial guidance on how to enforce restrictive
26
covenants in the telehealth industry as this issue is a recent development.
Therefore, a new method for determining the enforceability of physician
restrictive covenants in the telehealth industry is needed.
This note will argue that federal legislation should be passed in order
to make clear and consistent regulations for the enforcement of physician
27
non-competes and non-solicitation clauses in the telehealth sector. This
note's model framework in an effort to create uniformity for providers
practicing telehealth. This is especially relevant as state barriers for
physician licensure continue to be removed 28 and telehealth regulations
are relaxed.2 9 These changes will allow for increased usage of telehealth
30
visits for more individuals, and as a result increase access to healthcare.
The expansion of the telehealth market should not be impeded by
restrictive covenants.
There are four Parts to this note. Part I will provide a brief
background of the telehealth industry and the changing regulations that
surround it.31 Part II will look at the current laws surrounding the
enforcement of physician non-competes and non-solicitation clauses in
the traditional in-person healthcare field.3 2 Throughout Part II there will
be a discussion of the issues that arise when applying the traditional
restrictive covenant analysis to enforce telehealth physician non-competes
and non-solicitation clauses. 33 Part III will analyze the inconsistencies in
state enforcement of restrictive covenants and compare the different
approaches that are taken. 34
Part IV will offer solutions to these issues and suggest possible
language for federal legislation involving the enforcement of telehealth
physician restrictive covenants. 35 The proposed federal statute will place
the burden of proving the validity of the restrictive covenants on the
employers. 3 6 This will increase the likelihood that the restrictive
covenants are necessary to protect employer's legitimate business

26.

TANNENBAUM HELPERN SYRACUSE & HIRSCHTRITr LLP, supranote 24.

27. See infra Part III.
28. See infra Part I.B.2.
29. See infra Part I.B.2.
infra Part
infra Part
infra Part
infra Part

I.A.
I.
II.

30.
31.
32.
33.

See
See
See
See

35.
36.

See infra Part V.
See infra Part IV.

H.
34. See infra Part II.
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interests. 37 It will also increase the public health benefits that are gained
through the usage of telehealth services, and it will allow patients more
autonomy in selecting their physicians. 38
ADVANCEMENTS IN THE TELEHEALTH INDUSTRY AND THE
REGULATIONS SURROUNDING IT

I.

This Part provides background on the telehealth industry. 39 Section
A explores the early history of telehealth, and the effect COVID-19 has
played in the explosion of the telehealth market.4 0 Section B explores the
regulations and legal limitations on the practice of telehealth.4 1
A.

The History of Telehealth and the Rapid ExpansionDuring

COVID-19
Telemedicine has previously been defined as the "us[age] [of]
telecommunications technologies to transmit medical information to
Throughout its existence, the terms
support clinical care." 4 2
"telemedicine" and "telehealth" have often been used interchangeably,
with slight differences. 43 In 2020 the American Medical Association
(hereinafter "AMA") distinguished the meanings,44 and for the purposes
of this note, the following defmitions will be used. Telemedicine
describes the various online tools and platforms that healthcare providers
use to facilitate patient care, connect with other providers, remotely
monitor patients, and to collect medical data. 4 5 Telehealth more
specifically refers to the real-time audio and video technology that

37. See infra Part III.
38. See infra Part IV.A.
39. See infra Part I.
40. See infra Part I.A.
41. See infra Part I.B.
42. Vinod E. Nambudiri, Telemedicine: A Dynamic and Expanding Practice, 16 AM. MED.
ASS'N. J. ETHICS 957, 957 (2014), https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/sites/joumalofethics.ama-

assn.org/files/2018-05/fredl -1412.pdf.
43. INST. OF MED., THE ROLE OF TELEHEALTH IN AN EVOLVING HEALTH CARE ENVIRONMENT:
WORKSHOP SUMMARY 3 (2012). Telehealth and telemedicine were both used to describe any
exchange of medical information over electronic communications. Id. Specifically, telemedicine was
used for "direct patient clinical services," while telehealth was used as the broader term to describe
"remote health care services." Id.
44. See AM. MED. ASS'N, supra note 5, at 10.

45. Id.
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connects patients and physicians, and can be used as an alternative to an
in-person visit. 4 6
The concept of telehealth can be traced back to as early as 1879.47
One of the earliest mentions was when a news article suggested telephone
calls could be used to reduce the number of patient visits to the doctor's
office.4 8 Telehealth has since been used to greatly increase access to
medical knowledge and care. 4 9 Throughout its history, it has been used
to provide both in-home patient care and clinician-to-clinician
consulting. 50 Virtual telehealth visits now allow patients to meet with
physicians as a replacement for in-person visits for services such as
consultations, diagnoses, care management and the filling of
prescriptions.5 1 Preliminary research has shown that the use of telehealth
can improve health outcomes and reduce health care costs as it leads to
52
fewer hospitalizations and emergency room visits.
53
One telehealth provider
In 2020, telehealth saw rapid growth.
in the second quarter of
visits
health
alone conducted 2.8 million virtual
54
While telehealth was on a steady incline over the last few
the year.
decades, COVID-19 played a large role in the drastic spike of its usage,
55
It is speculated that
and growth is predicted to continue post-pandemic.
spending
healthcare
U.S.
of
current
there is approximately $250 billion
that can be switched to virtual health platforms instead of using traditional
in-person care. 56

46. Id. This note will focus on telehealth patient-provider visits.
47. INST. OF MED., supra note 43, at 11.

48. Id.
49. See id. at

1-13.

50. See id. Clinician-to-clinician consulting occurs when a physician with little to no
experience in how to treat a patient or perform a certain procedure calls a physician who is an expert
in the topic to walk them through the treatment. Id. at 11. It is commonly used in rural locations
because physicians there may not experience as many unique illnesses. Id.
51. See Jones, supra note 8.

52. victoria L. Elliot, Telehealth and Telemedicine: Description and Issues, CONG. RSCH.
29, 2016), https://www.senate.gov/CRSpubs/757e3b90-ffl0-497c-8e8cSERV. 2 (Mar.
aclbdbdb3aaf.pdf.
53.

See Jane Wester, Use of Telehealth Services Rising Amid Pandemic, But Long-Term

Outlook is Less Clear, GLOBEST (Aug. 25, 2020, 5:28 AM), https://www.globest.com/2020/08/25
/use-of-telehealth-services-rising-amid-pandemic-but-long-term-outlook-is-less-clear

/?slreturn=20200730145818.
54. Id. The provider also reported that there were three times more telehealth visits in 2020
compared to the same quarter in 2019. Id.
55. See Andrei Zimiles, Four New Statistics that Prove That Telemedicine Isn't Just a

PandemicFad, MEDICAL ECON. (July 8, 2020), https://www.medicaleconomics.com/view/four-newstatistics-that-prove-that-telemedicine-isn-t-just-a-pandemic-fad.
56. Bestsennyy, et.al., supra note 7.
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Currently, almost fifty percent of physicians now incorporate
telehealth in their practices. 57 In 2018, only eighteen percent of
physicians were conducting telehealth visits which shows a large spike as
a result of the pandemic. 58 Most patients that are utilizing telehealth had
their first ever visit during the pandemic. 59
Patients report high
satisfaction with telehealth and many plan to continue using these virtual
visits as part of their regular healthcare routine. 60 Support for overall
telehealth expansion has come from physicians, medical organizations, 6 1
patients, 62 Congress, 6 3 Health and Human Services (hereinafter
"HHS"),64 and former president Donald Trump's administration. 65
However, it should be noted that the rapid growth and satisfaction with
the usage of telehealth services may be impeded by the many regulations
surrounding its usage. 66

57. Survey: Physician Practice Patterns Changing as a Result of COVID-19, MERRITT
HAWKINS (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.merritthawkins.com/news-and-insights/media-room/press/Physician-Practice-Patterns-Changing-as-a-Result-of-COVID-19/.
This percentage comes from a
survey conducted by Merritt Hawkins, the largest physician search firm in the United States, based
on responses from 842 physicians across the country. Id.
58. Id. The researchers used the same study in 2018 as they used in 2020, showing the increase
in telehealth usage. Id.
59. KYRUUS, supranote 3, at 3. Researchers surveyed 1,000 patients of all age ranges in order
to get data on patient perspectives of telehealth. Id. at 2.

60.

Id. at 3.

61.

See Fincher, supra note 4; Eric Wicklund, Telehealth Advocates Launch Task Force to

Lobby for Permanent Policy Changes, MHEALTH INTELLIGENCE (June 18, 2020), https://
mhealthintelligence.com/news/telehealth-advocates-launch-task-force-to-lobby-for-permanent-

policy-changes.
62.

See KYRUUS, supra note 3, at 3.

63. See generally Medicare Telemedicine Health Care Provider Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/fact-sheets
/medicare-telemedicine-health-care-provider-fact-sheet (outlining the effect that the CARES Act, as
passed by Congress, has on the expansion of access to telehealth services through Medicaid and
Medicare reimbursement).
64. See HHSAwards Over $35 Million to IncreaseAccess to High Quality Health Carein Rural
Communities, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV. (Aug. 20, 2020), https://
public3.pagefreezer.com/browse/HHS%20%E2%80%93%C2%AAbout%20News/20-012021 TI 2:29/https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/08/20/hhs-awards-over-35-million-to-increaseaccess-to-high-quality-health-care-in-rural-communities.html. Over $10 million of the award will go
to programs and organizations tasked with increasing telehealth accessibility. Id.

65.

See Exec. Order No. 13941, 85 Fed. Reg. 47881 (Aug. 6, 2020). Titled "Improving Rural

Health and Telehealth Access," this executive order pushes for the increased use and quality of
telehealth in the United States. Id.
66. See infra Part I.B.
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B. Legal Limitationson Telehealth
Despite the increased usage and overall user satisfaction, telehealth
services are complicated by several regulatory matters including
the Health Insurance Portability and
physician licensing, 67
Accountability Act privacy and security rules, 68 and Medicaid and
Medicare reimbursement. 69 This note will discuss complications with the
enforcement of telehealth non-competes and non-solicitation clauses. 70
Telehealth regulations are further complicated by the drastic changes
made during COVID-19 and the lingering uncertainty of the application
of new regulations. 7 1
1.

The Interplay of Physician Licensing and Practicing
Telehealth

To practice medicine, physicians must obtain a medical license in the
state in which they wish to practice. 72 Physician licensing standards and

67. See Barnes, supra note 15, at 524-25; Using Telehealth to Expand Access to Essential
Health Services During the COVID-19 Pandemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,

(last updated June 10, 2020).
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/telehealth.htm
68. See Notification of Enforcement Discretion for Telehealth Remote Communications During
the COVID-19 Nationwide PublicHealth Emergency, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://
www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/special-topics/emergency-preparedness/notificationenforcement-discretion-telehealth/index.html (last updated Jan. 20, 2021). Normally, physicians
practicing telehealth have to use HIPAA compliant videoconferencing software in order to ensure the
privacy of patients. Id. Due to the necessary increase in telehealth services, the HIPAA regulations
will not be enforced as long as physicians use their professional judgment when conducting telehealth
visits over platforms like Zoom, Google Hangouts, Apple FaceTime or Skype. Id.
69. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 63. The use of telehealth
services is usually limited as Medicare beneficiaries are often unable to be reimbursed for these visits.
Id. However, as a response to COVID-19, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services has
broadened the services that it will reimburse allowing many beneficiaries to begin using telehealth.

Id.
70.

See generally infra Part II.

71. See Exec. Order No. 13941, 85 Fed. Reg. 47881, 47882 (Aug. 6, 2020); CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 63; PUB. HEALTH EMERGENCY, supra note 21; U.S.
States and Territories Modifying Requirements for Telehealth in Response to COVID-19, FED'N OF
STATE MED. BDS. 1, https://www.fsmb.org/siteassets/advocacy/pdf/states-waiving-licensurerequirements-for-telehealth-in-response-to-covid-19.pdf (last updated Aug. 23, 2021); see generally
Wester, supra note 53 (highlighting changes in the enforcement of telehealth regulations during
COVID-19 and the uncertainty as to whether the changed regulations will still be enforced after the
pandemic).
72. Navigating State Medical Licensure, AM. MED. ASS'N, https://www.ama-assn.org
/residents-students/career-planning-resource/navigating-state-medical-licensure (last visited Sept. 21,

2021).
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requirements are controlled by state law and state medical boards. 73 Many
states then have separate licensing requirements for the practice of
telehealth. 74 Traditionally, physicians practicing telehealth must be fully
licensed in the state in which their patient is located during the virtual
consult. 75 A physician located in New York may be treating a patient, via
telehealth, who lives in New Jersey. In order to comply with licensing
requirements, this physician must obtain two medical licenses - both in
New York and New Jersey. However, there are currently twelve states
that offer limited licenses specifically for interstate telehealth practice. 76
For example, the Texas Medical Board offers an Out-of-State
Telemedicine License that allows non-resident physicians to provide
telehealth services in Texas, but with this limited license the physician
would be excluded from in-person practice. 77
2.

The Increase of Interstate Medical Practice and Licensing

As telehealth popularity grows, physician licensing complicates its
expansion and efforts have been made to ease regulations. 78 Recognizing
that telehealth advancements would allow physicians to practice across
state lines, the Interstate Medical Compact (hereinafter "Compact") was
created in 2013 by various state medical boards with the intention of
streamlining the process of obtaining multiple state physician licenses,7 9
There are currently thirty states in the Compact and there are more states
that have introduced bills to join.80 While state medical boards have
started to take matters into their own hands, others have urged that
Congress take action and enact a federal physician licensing scheme to
increase access to healthcare and increase telehealth practice. 81

73. Id.
74.

See FED'N OF STATE MED. BDS., supranote 20.

75.
76.

See id.
See id.

77. Out-of-State Telemedicine License, TEx. MED. BD., http://www.tmb.state.tx.us/page
/telemedicine-license (last visited Jan. 23, 2021).
78. See INTERSTATE MED. LICENSURE COMPACT, supra note 20.
79. Id. The Compact was drafted by state medical boards, attorneys, and state legislatures. Id.
Physicians are allowed to apply once through the Compact and as long as they meet the requirements,
they can receive multiple state licenses in one transaction, rather than applying to each state

individually. Id.
80. Id.; see generally S.B. 7732, 2020 Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2020) https://www.nysenate.gov
/legislation/bills/2019/s7732 (illustrating New York's desire to join the Interstate Medical Compact
if passed by its legislation).

81. See generally Gabriel Scheffler, Unlocking Access to Health Care:A FederalistApproach
to Reforming Occupational Licensing, 29 HEALTH MATRIX 293, 298-99 (2019) (arguing that the
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Multistate practice was further advanced in response to COVID-19,
as the Secretary of HHS encouraged states to waive their state licensure
requirements and allow any physician with a valid license to practice
across state lines. 82 As a result, forty-five states implemented telehealth
licensure waivers in various ways temporarily allowing out-of-state
physicians to practice virtually in their respective states. 83 However, these
waivers were meant to be temporary; some have already lapsed, while
other states have more ambiguous language saying that the waivers will
expire after the end of the pandemic. 84 Physicians and medical
organizations have expressed concerns with the repercussions that are
likely to occur as the telehealth waivers expire-most significantly they
predict a disruption of patient care. 85 The American College of Physicians
urges that the physician interstate licensure flexibility be made permanent
in order to allow the continuous expansion of telehealth and increase
patient access to healthcare services.86
3.

Federal Legislation Introduced to Make Telehealth
Regulations Permanent

Actions were taken under the Trump Administration to make the new
telehealth regulations permanent, specifically the portions of the
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (hereinafter
87
The
"CARES Act") that allow Medicaid and Medicare reimbursement.
Options
Telehealth
Permanent
of
Efficacy
and
Efficiency
Knowing the
Act of 2020 was introduced to Congress to study the usage of telehealth
during COVID-19 and assess the possibility of making the temporary
The Telehealth Act was also
telehealth regulations permanent. 88
of creating uniform telehealth
the
intentions
with
Congress
introduced to
89
One section of the Telehealth Act focuses on the interstate
guidelines.
practice of telehealth.9 0 If enacted, the Secretary of HHS is expected to

current licensing system for physicians and other healthcare professionals impedes access to
healthcare and that the federal government can and should take action to preempt the state laws).
82. PUB. HEALTH EMERGENCY, supranote 21.
83. See generally FED'N OF STATE MED. BDS., supra note 71.

84.

See id.

85.

Fincher, supranote 4.

86. Id.
87. Exec. Order No. 13941, 85 Fed. Reg. 47881, 47882 (Aug. 6, 2020).
88. Knowing the Efficiency and Efficacy of Permanent Telehealth Options Act of 2020, H.R.
7233, 116th Cong. (2020).
89. Telehealth Act, H.R. 7992, 116th Cong. (2020).
90. Id. § 501.
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consult with a variety of healthcare entities (such as technology and data
security experts, primary care/specialty/mental health providers,
academic medical center, health departments, federal agencies,
consumers, and etc.) to create a "Uniform Best Practices" guideline to
create uniformity for healthcare providers practicing telehealth across
state lines. 9 1 Despite the proposed legislation, nothing permanent has
been decided as to which regulations or waivers will still be in place when
the pandemic comes to an end. 92 As it stands, healthcare providers and
physicians are currently left to navigate the uncertain and changing
telehealth regulations on a day-to-day basis. 93
4.

Practicing Telehealth While Still Complying with
Restrictive Covenants

One obstacle that has yet to be addressed is the enforceability of
restrictive covenants for physicians that practice telehealth across state
lines. 94 As physicians continue to practice telehealth at growing rates and
increasingly practice across state lines, an almost limitless geographic
scope of practice will be created. 9 5 The current state of non-compete law
is inadequate to address these issues. 96 This will further be complicated
by the enforcement inconsistencies between the states by both state
statutes and court made rules. 9 7
The following sections will explain the current law surrounding noncompetes and non-solicitation clauses in general, and the intricacies of
these clauses when physicians are involved. 98 There is currently little to
no case law regarding the enforcement of restrictive covenants for
physicians practicing telehealth as this is a relatively new issue. 99 As
telehealth regulations continue to rapidly change in the wake of COVID19,100 the need for a uniform regulatory scheme for physician restrictive
covenants is a pressing issue. 10 1
91. Id.
92. See ASTHO Staff, What's Next for Telehealth: States Try to Make COVID-19 Telehealth
Options Permanent, ASTHO (Apr. 29, 2021, 2:59 PM), https://www.astho.org/StatePublicHealth

/States-Try-to-Make-COVID-19-Telehealth-Options-Permanent/04-29-21/.
93.
94.

See supraPart I.B.1-2.
See TANNENBAUM HELPERN SYRACUSE & HIRSCHTRITT LLP, supra note 24.

95. Id.
96. Id
97. See infra Part III.
98.
99.
100.

101.

See infra Part I1.
TANNENBAUM HELPERN SYRACUSE & HIRSCHTRITT LLP, supra note 24.
See supraPart LB.
See infra PartI.
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DIFFICULTIES WITH PHYSICIAN RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
AS APPLIED TO TELEHEALTH

This Part looks at the current landscape that healthcare providers and
physicians must navigate in order to enter into employment agreements
102
that contain non-compete agreements and non-solicitation clauses.
Section A discusses non-competes in general and the legal theory courts
use in enforcing them as applied to physicians. 03 Physician restrictive
covenants, including both non-competes and non-solicitation clauses are
especially difficult to enforce as there are strong competing interests
which will also be discussed. 104 Section B analyzes the different
approaches that states take in enforcing physician covenants. 105
Throughout there will be a discussion of the added difficulties that
106
telehealth creates and how the existing legal theory is insufficient.
A.

The GeneralApplication of Non-Competes and the Pushfor
FederalAction

.

A non-compete agreement is, "[a] contract limiting a party from
07
More
competing with a business after termination of employment."
than 36 million private-sector employees in the United States are bound
by non-compete agreements. 10 8 Traditionally, a non-compete clause will
prohibit both current and terminated employees from performing
specified competitive activities in a certain geographic location for a set
period of time. 109 A very basic non-compete agreement may contain a
provision stating, "for [time period] following the termination of
Employee's employment, Employee will not ... become employed by. .

102.
103.
104.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part IIA.
See infra Part II.C.

105. See infra Part II.B.
106. See infra Part f.
Agreement,
107. Noncompete

THE

FREE

DICTIONARY,

https://legal-

dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Noncompete+Agreement (last visited Sept. 21, 2021).
108. Braden Campbell, 36 Million Workers Bound by Noncompetes, Survey Says, LAw360 (Dec.

10, 2019, 2:02 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1226030/36-million-workers-bound-bynoncompetes-survey-says.
109. Non-Compete Agreements: Key Negotiation, Drafting, and Legal Issues, LEXIS (last
updated July 22, 2021), https://plus.lexis.com/practice-advisor-home (search in search bar for "Non-

Compete Agreements: Key Negotiation, Drafting, and Legal Issues"; then click the first result).
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any enterprise ... within [geographic limitation] ... that engages in the
same business as . .. the Company." 11 0
The enforceability of non-compete agreements have been governed
by state law for almost 200 years." ' Most states have statutory provisions
addressing whether non-competes are allowed, any limitations, and any
exemptions.11 2 Over the years, many states have modified regulations
about non-competes. 113 Some states have strengthened them, others have
segmented the regulations based on the employment sector involved, and
others have considered banning them all together.1 1 4 These differences
will be discussed in-depth in Section E, more specifically analyzing the
effect of non-compete agreements on physicians. 115
The inconsistency in non-compete regulations has sparked federal
interest in creating federal statutory regulations. 1 1 6 Three separate bills
have been introduced in Congress to change current non-compete
regulations in different industries and create federal regulation.117 The
Mobility and Opportunity for Vulnerable Employees Act sought to
prohibit employers from requiring low-wage employees to sign restrictive
covenants, 11 8 and the Workforce Mobility Act of 2018 was introduced to
ban restrictive covenants in their totality.' 19 While neither of these bills
passed, there remains an interest in creating federal uniform regulations,
particularly in the medical field.1 20
In states that allow non-competes, the enforceability of the
agreement is determined by the courts, with most using the rule of reason

110. Non-Compete, Customer and Employee Non-solicitation, and Confidentiality Agreement,
LEXIS (last updated July 22, 2021), https://plus.lexis.com/practice-advisor-home (search in
search bar for "Non-Compete, Customer and Employee Non-solicitation, and Confidentiality
Agreement"; then click "content type" on the left menu and select "templates;" then click the first

§ 5(a),

result).
111. Russell Beck & Erika Hahn, Noncompete Misconceptions May Be Inhibiting Reform,
LAw360 (Dec. 17, 2019, 3:29 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1228569/noncompetemisconceptions-may-be-inhibiting-reform.
112. See generallyRussell Beck, Employee Noncompetes: A State by State Survey, BECK REED
RIDEN LLP (July 31, 2016), https://beckreedriden.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Noncompetes-

50-State-Survey-Chart-20160731.pdf. California and Oklahoma are examples of states that do not
allow noncompete agreements across all employment sectors. See id. at 1, 10.
113. See Beck & Hahn, supra note 111.

114. Id.
115. See infra Part II.E.
116.

See Beck & Hahn, supra note

111.

117. Id.
118. The Mobility and Opportunity for vulnerable Employees Act, S. 1504, 114th Cong. (2015).
119. Workforce Mobility Act of 2019, S. 2614, 116th Cong. (2019).
120.

See Beck & Hahn, supra note 111.
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test, also referred to as the reasonableness test. 12 1 In order to satisfy the
rule of reason test, the restrictive covenant cannot be broader than
necessary to protect the employer's business interests, cannot unduly
12 2
The
burden the employee, and lastly cannot cause harm to the public.
rule of reason test then looks at four factors to determine enforceability of
restrictive covenants: (1) whether the employer has a legitimate and
protectable business interest; (2) whether the restrictive covenant is
reasonably protecting that interest; (3) whether it unduly burdens the
23
The time and
employee; and (4) whether it harms the public.1
24
reasonable.1
be
also
must
non-compete
by
a
geographic area restricted
125
Generally non-competes are determined on a case-by-case basis.
Because disputes over the validity of non-compete agreements are fact
centered and determined by the court, 126 they are very time-consuming
and can be very costly to resolve. 127 Despite these drawbacks, noncompetes are used at an increasing rate.1 28 The enforcement of noncompetes against physicians is particularly hard to determine because
there are strong interests on all sides: the employer, the physician, the
public, and the patients.1 29
B. Non-Compete Agreements as Enforced Against Physicians
The use of physician non-compete agreements has been harshly
criticized for years and by many organizations. 13 0 For example, the AMA
cautions physicians from entering into non-competes that unreasonably
restrict competition and disrupt the continuity of patient care, but
recognizes that there may be some legitimate business interests that

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Malloy, supranote 19, at 192.
Id.
Id. at 196.
Id. at 195.
Id. at 196.
Id. at 235.

127.

A. Kevin Troutman, Physician Non-Compete Agreements Present Challenges, Potential

Controversy, FISHER PHILLIPS (Dec. 26, 2019), https://www.fisherphillips.com/Non-Compete-andTrade-Secrets/physician-non-compete-agreements.

128. Id.
129.

See Judy Ann Clausen, Regulate Physician Restrictive Covenants to Improve Healthcare,

108 KY. L. J. 111, 132 (2019).
130. Jill Kahn Marshall, Debate and Developments Around Non-Competes in Physician
Agreements, REAVIS PAGE JUMP LLP: (Feb. 24, 2020), https://rpjlaw.com/developments-noncompetes-physician-agreements/; Malloy, supra note 19, at 236; see generally Clark, supra note 18
(discussing how the trend among states is to limit non-compete agreements).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol39/iss1/6

14

Willis: Utilizing Telehealth to Practice Medicine across State Lines: The

2021]

ENFORCEABILITY OFPHYSICIAN NON-COMPETEAGREEMENTS

227

employers are trying to protect.1 3 1 Enforcing physician non-competes is
a very costly and lengthy process in almost all jurisdictions.1 32 Despite
the criticism, physician non-competes are being used at an increasing
rate, 133 with one study finding that approximately forty-five percent of
primary care physicians are bound by such an agreement.1 34
Physician non-competes and non-solicitation clauses are unique
because they must weigh not only the employer and employee interests,
but also the interests of patients.1 3 5 Enforcement of a non-compete may
lead to the possible disruption of patient care if a physician is no longer
allowed to treat a patient.1 36 The majority of states and courts still enforce
physician non-competes.1 37 However, a few states have restricted the use
of physician non-competes making them harder to enforce, while some
have even prohibited them altogether.1 38 Former President Trump's
administration recommended that all states scrutinize their current
policies and enforcement procedures for physician non-competes so that
physicians can provide better patient care. 139
Integral to the healthcare system is the creation of the physicianpatient relationship, which once formed creates a series of duties on both
the physician and the institutional employer.1 40 A physician-patient
relationship is formed on the mutual consent of the patient and physician
when the physician begins providing medical care. 14 1 One duty that is
created by the physician-patient relationship is the duty not to abandon a
131.

Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 11.2.3.1: Restrictive Covenants, AM. MED. ASS'N, https://

www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/restrictivecovenants#:-:text=Ethics%200pinion%2011.2.-

,3.1,%2C%20fees%2C%20or%20credit%20terms.&text=Do%20not%20make%20reasonable%20a

ccommodation%20for%20patients'%20choice%200f%20physician (last visited Oct. 14, 2021).
132.

See Troutman, supra note 127.

133.

Id.

Kurt Lavetti, et al., The Impacts of Restricting Mobility of Skilled Service Workers:
Evidence from Physicians, 55 J. HUM. RES. 1025, 1030 (2020).
135. See infra Part II.C.
134.

136.

See Marshall, supra note 130.

137. Id.
138. See id.
139. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, U.S. DEP'T OF LAB.,
REFORMING AMERICA'S HEALTHCARE SYSTEM THROUGH CHOICE AND COMPETITION 1, 110 (2018),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/Reforming-Americas-Healthcare-System-Through-Choiceand-Competition.pdf [hereinafter HHS Report].
140. See generally BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND
PROBLEMS 90-96 (Jesse H. Choper et al. eds., abr. 8 ° ed. 2018) (discussing the duties that physicians
owe to patients).

141.

Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 1.1.1: Patient-Physician Relationships, AM. MED. ASS'N,

https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/patient-physician-relationships

(last visited Oct. 14,

2021).
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142
This duty
patient with whom a treatment relationship has been formed.
owed by the physician is complicated by the enforcement of nonCourts in different
competes and non-solicitation agreements. 143
jurisdictions have enforced non-competes that have hindered the
physician-patient relationship, disrupted patient continuity of care, and
have stopped physicians from treating their patients. 144 Enforcing these
14 5
The
non-competes can be harmful to both patients and physicians.
interruption of physician-patient relationships is just one of the reasons
why enforcing non-compete agreements is so hard.

C. Balancing the Needs of Patients, Providers, Employers, and the
Public
In jurisdictions that allow non-compete agreements to be enforced
against physicians, a court that applies the rule of reason test will first look
at the interests of the employer.1 46 The first requirement in enforcing a
non-compete agreement is to identify the employer's legitimate business
interest and to determine whether the restrictive covenant is actually
protecting those interests. 147 Employers using non-compete agreements
and non-solicitation clauses are usually trying to prevent their employees
from leaving to go work for a competitor, poaching customer contacts (or
patients), sharing confidential business practices, sharing unique business
strategies, and more. 148 As for business interests in the healthcare
industry, courts have found that the following are valid and subject to
being protected: "the patient base, training of physicians, trade secrets,
confidential business information, goodwill, reputation, and patient
referral sources." 1 4 9 After identifying a valid business interest, courts will
then apply the reasonableness test to determine whether the enforcement
of the non-compete will actually protect the employer's business
0
interests.1 5

142.

FURROW ET AL., supranote 140, at 95.

143.
144.
145.
146.

See infra Part I.B.
Clausen, supra note 129, at 116-18.
See id. at 116.
See id. at 129.

147. See Malloy, supra note 19, at 196.
148. See Katherine Benesch, Update on Covenants Not to Compete: Will They Survive in the
HealthcareIndustry?, HOSP. & HEALTH SYS. 1, 2 (Feb. 10, 2006), http://archive.healthlawyers.org
/google/health_law_archive/programpapers2/2006_HHS/benesch.pdf.

149. Clausen, supra note 129, at 130 (citing Wichita Clinic, P.A. v. Louis, 185 P.3d 946, (Kan.
Ct. App. 2008)).
150. See id.
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Next, courts will evaluate the physician's interests and whether the
enforcement of the non-compete will unduly burden them. 15 1
Unfortunately, courts do not evaluate the interests of the physician as
thoroughly as they evaluate the interests of the business. 152 The undue
burden imposed on a physician rarely leads to a court rendering the
restrictive covenant void.1 53 This is especially troublesome as reports
have shown that non-competes are often overly burdensome and place
restrictions on the physicians bound by them.1 54
While many employees involved in non-compete litigation will
advance the argument that they have an interest in job mobility and the
need to make a living for their family, courts are unlikely to accept such
an argument.1 55 Instead, courts place more weight on an individual's right
to contract over their right to change jobs, even as applied to physicians
being prevented from providing medical services. 156 Thus, most courts
will not find that a physician is unduly burdened by the enforcement of a
non-compete agreement and this argument will fail. 15 7 Interestingly,
Florida has a statute that expressly bans courts from considering the undue
burden and economic burden a restrictive covenant may have on an
individual and the economic hardship that may result from enforcing the
non-compete agreement.1 58 Because of the hardships that may be
imposed on physicians if a non-compete agreement is enforced, some
doctors and organizations recommend that telehealth be used as a way to
get around their non-compete agreement. 159 However, this option may
not be viable because of the current state of enforcing non-compete
agreements for physicians practicing telehealth.1 60
Public interest and likelihood of harm is the last interest that courts
will look at in determining the reasonableness of enforcing a non-compete

151. See Malloy, supra note 19, at 196.
152.

Greta Mattison Megna, The Doctor Will See You Now - From 100 Miles Away: Navigating

Physician Non-Compete Agreements in the Age of Telemedicine, WIS. L. REV. 1007, 1015 (2017).
153.
154.

Clausen, supra note 129, at 131.
HHS Report, supranote 139, at 62.

155. Megna, supra note 152, at 1015-16.
156. Id. at 1016.
157.

See id.; Clausen, supranote 129, at 131.

158.

FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 542.335(1)(g)(1)

(West 2020).

159. See Heidi Moawad, M.D., Non-compete Clauses: What Physicians Need to Know,
MEDICAL ECON. (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.medicaleconomics.com/view/non-compete-clauseswhat-physicians-need-know; Ashley Shaw, Telemedicine: How to Defeat the Non-Compete,
PHYSICIAN ON FIRE, https://www.physicianonfire.com/defeat-the-non-compete/ (last visited Oct. 14,

2021).
160.

See infra Part I1.
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agreement. 161 It is fairly clear that the public has a strong interest in
whether a physician will be restricted from practicing because that
enforcement may interfere with the quality of care and cause a disruption
of the patient-provider relationship. 162 Reports done during both the
Obama presidency 163 and the Trump presidency scrutinize the
enforcement of physician non-competes as they have the potential to
decrease access to care which in turn harms the public.164 These reports
indicate that the restrictive covenants limit job mobility, which reduces
165
employee bargaining power and may limit the supply of providers.
16 6
This in turn may cause an inflation in healthcare costs.
While the job mobility argument may not succeed when raised by an
individual physician, 167 it holds more weight when many physicians are
restricted leading to public health issues. 168 Public health arguments are
also stronger when advocating against not restricting providers from
practicing telehealth. This is because telehealth increases access to health
care providers, especially in underserved communities and in rural
areas. 169 Public health concerns are even more prevalent right now amidst
the COVID-19 pandemic, and it is incredibly important that physicians
70
are allowed to continue seeing patients with telehealth platforms.'
Public policy arguments are gaining strength as courts are
considering harm to the public at an increasing weight when analyzing the
enforceability of physician non-competes.171 Some courts pay particular
attention-to "the public's right to freedom of choice among physicians, the
right to continue an ongoing relationship with a physician and the benefits
derived from having an increased number of physicians in any given
community."172 These patient rights likely stem from evidence that shows
continuity of care with the same provider is a crucial aspect to patient
satisfaction and adherence with treatment. 173

161.

Malloy, supranote 19, at 196, 200.

162. See Non-Compete Agreements: Analysis of the Usage, Potential Issues, and State
Responses, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE 14 (May 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites

/default/files/non-competesreportfinal2.pdf.
163. Id. at 2.
164.

See HHS Report, supra note 139, at 63.

165. Id. at 62.
166. Id.
167.

See Megna, supra note 152, at 1015-16; Clausen, supra note 129, at 131.

168. See HHS Report, supranote 139, at 62.
169.
170.
171.

INST. OF MED., supra note 43, at 11.
See supra Introduction.
Benesch, supranote 148, at 2.

172. Id.
173. Malloy, supranote 19, at 204.
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Despite the growing strength of public policy arguments, the right to
have uninterrupted physician-patient relationships is not being considered
with as much weight as it should be.1 74 This is likely because some courts
still ignore the importance of having an ongoing physician-patient
relationship on a patient's health.1 75 Courts still enforce non-competes
that break apart physician-patient relationships.1 76 Rather, courts focus
on general access to care in the area, instead of patient access to a specific
physician. 177 Courts look at the number of alternative physicians in an
area that a patient may be able to utilize if they can no longer see their
original physician. 178 When a court does this, it disregards the health
benefits associated with a continuous relationship with a specific
physician.1 79 For example, in Dickinson Medical Group v. Foote, the
court enforced a restrictive covenant against a physician that was the only
board-certified oncologist in the hospital and prevented her from
continuing chemotherapy treatment with her patients after she left the
hospital.1 80 Although the doctor argued that she had a professional and
ethical duty to keep treating her patients, and the court sympathized with
her patients, the court still found the restrictive covenant enforceable. 18 1
Once a court looks at the interests of all parties involved (the
employer, physician, and patient), it will draw a conclusion as to whether
to enforce the restrictive covenant.1 82 Even when courts are balancing the
same opposing interests, they reach different conclusions on
enforceability depending on the jurisdiction. 183 These inconsistencies
surrounding physician non-competes likely stem from the wide range of
state approaches in determining enforceability.1 84 For example, harm to
the public has led to some states prohibiting physician non-competes all
together, while others have not.1 85

174.

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
1984).
181.
182.
183.

See Clausen, supra note 129, at 132.

Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Dickinson Med. Grp. v. Foote, No. 834-K, 1984 WL 8208, at *1, *1 (Del. Ch. May 10,
Id. at *2.
See id. at *3.
See supra Part II.C.

184. See infra Part H.E.
185.

See supra Part 1I.B.
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D. The Reasonableness Test Applied to Time and Geographic
Scope
1.

Typical Application to Traditional Physician Restrictive
Covenants

After a court analyzes the reasonableness of business interests, the
undue burden on the physician, and potential harm to the public, it will
again apply the reasonableness test to the geographic area being restricted
and the length time of the non-compete. 186 While there is great variation
jurisdiction-to-jurisdiction, and it is dependent on the facts of each case, a
common market definition for enforceable physician non-competes are
those that "include the county containing the practice or a 20-mile radius
around the practice . . . and two to three years [of restriction] is often
deemed reasonable." 18 7 While time restricted is assessed on a case-bycase basis, courts have enforced physician non-competes ranging from
two years in length to as high as five years. 188 In determining the
reasonableness of the time restricted, courts should not enforce lengths of
time that are longer than necessary for the business to fill the departing
89
physician's position and for the new employee to become effective.1
When analyzing geographic scope, the area restrained cannot be
arbitrary. 190 Rather, to be enforceable it must be drawn in a location
designed to protect the specific area in which the employer has shown
business interests. 19 1 The geographic scope is often defined as "the area
192
in which the former employee did business on behalf of the employer."
For physicians, the geographic territory consists of the area where most
1 93
Courts
of the physician's patients come from and the area of practice.
will often analyze a restrictive covenant's time and geographic restriction
in tandem; a longer time restriction may be accepted only if a small
geographic area is listed and vice versa. 194 For example, one court
enforced a restrictive covenant that prohibited a physician from practicing

186.

See Malloy, supra note 19, at 197 n.41.

187. Lavetti, et al., supra note 134, at 1030.
188. Paula Berg, Judicial Enforcement of Covenants Not to Compete Between Physicians:
ProtectingDoctors'Interests at Patients'Expense, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 25 (1992).

189. Id. at 24-25.
190.

See Benesch, supra note 148, at 7.

191. Id.
192.

Emily J. Kuo, Comment, The Enforceability Gap of Covenants Not to Compete in

Telecommuting Employment Relationships, 1996 UNIV. CHI. LEGAL F. 565, 571 (1996).
193. Berg, supranote 188, at 26.
194. Kuo, supranote 192, at 573.
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for ten years after rewriting it to only restrict the geographic area of city
of the practice plus a radius of five miles.1 95
2.

Applicability, or Lack Thereof, of Geographic Scope to
Physicians Practicing Telehealth

The geographic boundary analysis creates problems for the
application of non-competes to telehealth providers. 196 As telehealth
breaks down state licensing regulations and physicians can practice in
multiple states, 197 the geographic scope that physicians are treating
patients in can become almost a limitless territory. 198 The current judicial
landscape of evaluating non-competes under a reasonableness standard
simply does not apply when looking at the possible geographic territories
involved with restrictive covenants in the telehealth industry. 199
For telehealth providers, it is quite possible that a physician could be
physically located in one state and be providing virtual visits to a patient
that is 500-miles away in another state. Attempting to enforce a noncompete over such a vast territory could prevent a physician from
practicing in the entire state where they reside and any other states in
which they may be providing services. The possibility of multi-state
practice may also create financial burdens for physicians as they currently
have to maintain multiple medical licenses until the licensing scheme
changes. 200 An alternative approach is needed for enforcing non-compete
agreements against physicians in telehealth.

195.

See Foltz v. Struxness, 215 P.2d 133, 135, 139 (Kan. 1950) (upholding the trial court finding

that the restrictive covenant was enforceable against the employee-physician. Originally, the
restrictive covenant was for 10 years and a radius of 100 miles. The Physician argued that the entire
covenant should be unenforceable based on this, but the court disagreed. The trial court found that
100 miles was too expansive but used its discretion to decrease the radius to 5 miles outside of the
town where the practice was located). It is because of the small geographic radius that the longer
length of time was permitted. See id at 138.
196. TANNENBAUM HELPERN SYRACUSE & HIRSCHTRITT LLP, supra note 24.
197. See supra Part I.B.2.
198. See TANNENBAUM HELPERN SYRACUSE & HIRSCHTRITT LLP, supra note 24.
199. Karina Gonzalez, Telemedicine Contracts: Non Compete Agreements, FLA. HEALTHCARE
L. FIRM (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.floridahealthcarelawfirm.com/telemedicine-florida-contract-

telehealth/.
200.

See supra Part I.B.1
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Substitutesfor Limitations on a Large Geographic Scope in
Other Industries

The healthcare market is not the first industry that has shifted to
virtual work and expanded the geographic scope of their businesses. In
the 1990s, there was large growth in telecommuting, which has allowed
businesses to have nationwide markets. 20 1 Employers and courts began
modifying the geographic scope element of non-compete agreements in
order to find them valid. 202 Some alternatives include replacing the
203
geographic limit with "activity-based limits," "customer-based" limits,
204
While some jurisdictions have
and the "major competitor" limits.
updated their reasonable analysis, other courts will simply find restrictive
205
As
covenants invalid if there is no geographical territory written in.
discussed previously, the practice of telehealth increases the geographic
scope of practice, thus an alternative is needed if non-compete agreements
are to be enforceable. 206 However, these alternatives (activity based,
customer based, and the major competitor analysis) do not work well in
the healthcare industry. 20 7 The jurisdictional inconsistencies will further
20 8
complicate any attempted application of these alternatives.
1.

Activity-Based Restrictions and its Inapplicability to
Physicians

Online-based employers have replaced the geographic restriction in
209
An
their non-compete agreements with activity-based restrictions.
activity-based restriction typically enumerates specific services that an
employee would be prohibited from performing for a competitor for the
span of the non-compete agreement. 2 10 In order to be enforced, activitybased restrictions need to be narrowly tailored to only restrict the actual
21
job description and tasks that the employee performs. 1 A narrowly
201.

See Kuo, supra note 192, at 567-68.

202. Id. at 573-74.
203. See id. at 569.
204. Megna, supranote 152, at 1024-25.
205. See Kuo, supra note 192, at 574 (citing Tamburo v. Calvin, 1995 WL 121539 (N.D. Ill.
1995) (memo)).
206.

See supra Part I.

207. See infra Part II.B.E.1-2.
208. See infra Part III.
209. See Steven Cooper & Ellie A. Levy, Commentary, Non-Competition Agreements in
Cyberspace, 1 No. 21 E-TRADING LEGAL ALERT 3 (Mar. 16, 2001).

210. Id.
211. Id.
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tailored activity-based restriction with a reasonable time period will likely
be enforceable in industries where a geographic restriction would be
inapplicable. 212
While physicians practicing telehealth are also following an online
employment format with broad geographic border, activity-based
restraints would be hard to enforce as it could have negative effects on
public policy. 2 13 Medicine is a highly specialized profession requiring
years of education, training and licensing requirements. 2 14 Licensing
requirements already enumerate the scope of practice and activities that a
physician can perform. 2 15 Enforcing an activity-based restriction against
physicians that are already highly regulated would drastically hinder not
only where they can practice, but also the types of medical procedures that
they can perform. 2 16 This would negate the public health benefits of the
increased usage of telehealth, such as increased access to care and
increased access to specialized physicians. 2 17 Thus, this alternative fails
in the telehealth industry.
2.

Major Competitor Restrictions and its Inapplicability to
Physicians

The major competitor restriction, also known as the rule -of
reasonable competition, is another alternative that employers have used in
attempting to restrict large geographic areas. 2 18 Instead of restricting
employees from working in a specific geographic area, under this
approach an employer can enumerate its major competitors and explicitly
state that its employee cannot work for that specific competitive
company. 2 19 The employer cannot make an exhaustive list, but rather
must leave a sufficient number of "permissible employers." 2 20 Using the
reasonable competition approach in the telehealth industry could be
complicated. The healthcare industry is a huge market with an estimated

212.

Id.

213.
214.

See supra Part I.C.
See Megna, supra note 152, at 1023.

215. See AM. MED. ASS'N, supra note 72.
216. See Megna, supra note 152, at 1023.
217. See supra Part I.
218. See Michael S. Green & Laura P. Chiasson, Covenants Not to Compete: An Old Dog with

a New Bite, 39 ARIZ. ATT'Y 18,20 (2003).
219. Id. at 21.
220. Id.
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784,626 healthcare companies in the United States. 22 1 With the increase
in the number of physicians and employers using telehealth, it may be
difficult to enumerate and restrict competitors.
3.

Client-Based Restrictions

"Client-based" restrictions are another method that employers and
courts have considered when finding a substitute for geographic
restrictions in non-compete agreements. 222 As previously discussed,
223
In the
patients make up the main client base for healthcare providers.
traditional reasonableness approach to analyzing non-compete
agreements, an employer's client base is often recognized as a protectable
business interest. 224 Because of this protectable interest, some courts have
been willing to enforce non-compete agreements that lack geographical
225
restrictions if the covenant applies to a narrowly defined client base.
226
Employers also often protect their clients with non-solicitation clauses.
While restricting departing employees from contacting previous
clients may work in other industries, this restriction is complicated in the
healthcare industry. 227 This is often because of the patient-provider
22 8
Clientrelationship and the duty that physicians owe to their patients.
expanding
for
the
solution
the
best
are
not
based restrictive covenants
geographic scope of the telehealth industry. 229 These issues will be
discussed in-depth in the next section when speaking of non-solicitation
clauses.
F. The Application of Non-Solicitation Clausesfor Physicians
Along with physicians being asked to sign non-compete
agreements, it is often commonplace for employers to enforce non221. See Smiljanic Stasha, The State of Health Care Industry, POLICYADVICE (Aug. 6, 2021),
https://policyadvice.net/insurance/insights/healthcare-statistics
2
0f%20%2 4 2 0
/#:~:text=There%20are%20784%2C626%20companies%20in,annual%20revenue%
8.3%20billion.
222. Summary of Covenants Not to Compete: A Global Perspective, FENWICK & WEST LLP 92
https://assets.fenwick.com/legacy/FenwickDocuments/RS_Summary-of-Covenants.pdf (last visited

Jan. 26, 2021).
223. See Benesch, supra note 148, at 1.
224.

FENWICK & WEST LLP, supranote 222, at 214.

225. Id. at 83, 212, 292.
226. See infra Part IIF.
227. See infra Part II.F.
228.
229.

See supra Part IL B.
See infra Part IV.
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solicitation clauses. 230 A non-solicitation clause often includes language
stating that, "[an] Employee shall not ... solicit, communicate with or
otherwise contact any of the Company's customers ...
[geographic
limitation, if applicable], with whom Employee had material contact
during Employee's employment." 23 1 In healthcare, the customers are
most commonly identified as the patients. 232 A non-solicitation clause
prevents a departing physician from soliciting patients to follow the
physician to a new practice. 233
A physician does not have to expressly ask patients to follow them
after departing an employer to be in breach of a non-solicitation clause. 2 34
The standard is much lower meaning that merely "providing ...
information that might encourage [patients] to enroll in another health
plan" is enough to breach a non-solicitation agreement. 235 This low
standard becomes an issue 236 as physicians have a duty to give notice to
their patients when the physician plans on departing. 237
1.

Balancing Non-Solicitation Clauses with Legal and Ethical
Duties

This duty to notify is both an ethical one imposed by the AMA, 238
and a legal duty to terminate the physician-patient relationship and
arrange for follow-up care if necessary. 239 According to the AMA Code
of Medical Ethics, "physicians' [have a] fiduciary responsibility to
patients [which] entails an obligation to support continuity of care," also
known as a duty not to abandon. 240 In order to meet this responsibility,
physicians withdrawing from care must give their patient advanced notice

230. See David Dearden, Understanding Confidentiality and Nonsolicitation Clauses, AM.
ACAD. OF FAM. PHYSICIANS (July 2000), https://www.aafp.org/fpm/2000/0700/p73.htrnl.
231. Non-Compete, Customer and Employee Non-solicitation, and ConfidentialityAgreement,
supra note 110.
232. See Benesch, supranote 148.
233. See Non-Compete, Customer and Employee Non-solicitation, and Confidentiality

Agreement, supranote 110.
234.

Grant H. Morris, DissingDisclosure:Just What the Doctor Ordered, 44 ARIZ. L. REv. 313,

350 (2002).
235. Id.
236.
237.
MED.

See supra Part l.B.
Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 1.1.5: Terminatinga Patient-PhysicianRelationship, AM.
Ass'N,
https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/terminating-patient-physician-

relationship (last visited Oct. 15, 2021).
238. Id.
239.

240.

See generally FURROW ET AL., supranote 140, at 95.
AM. MED. ASS'N, supra note 237.
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24
that would allow the patient to find another physician. 1 When
necessary, the departing physician must assist the patient with the transfer
242
of care by making arrangements to see a new physician.
A physician that does not notify patients of a discontinuance of care
may also be subject to medical malpractice claims and could be found
liable for a breach of duty.24 3 If a departing physician attempts to comply
with their duty not to abandon by informing patients of the time of
departure and provides the name of the physician's new practice, it is
2 44
possible that the physician has breached a non-solicitation agreement.
Thus, physicians who have signed non-solicitation agreements have to
balance the fine distinction between fulfilling their legal and ethical duty
2 45
to their patients with the terms of their employment contract.

2.

Courts Enforcing Non-Solicitation Clauses

When determining the enforceability of a non-solicitation clause,
courts often use a four-part test.24 6 A non-solicitation clause must (1) not
injure the public; (2) not be broader than necessary to protect the
employer's interests; (3) not create an undue hardship on the departing
employee; and (4) be reasonable as to time limited and geographic scope
restricted. 247 This test is very similar to the one many courts apply to non-

compete agreements. 248
1n attempting-to find a balance between competing interests, one
court developed a standard that would allow physicians to notify patients
and to protect employer interests. 249 A departing physician giving proper
notification to patients (1) should supply enough information that would
allow the patient to continue receiving care from the physician when they
leave the practice; (2) should give the name and address of the physician's
new practice and the means to transfer a patient's medical records to the
practice (if applicable); and (3) should not include language that would
encourage the patient to transfer care and follow their physician to the new

241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Magana v. Elie, 439 N.E.2d 1319, 1323 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).
244. The Intersection Between Non-Solicitation and Patient Abandonment, JACKSON LLP,
https://jacksonllp.com/non-solicitation-patient-abandonment/#_ftn2

(last visited Jan. 24, 2021).

245. Id.
246.

Dearden, supra note 230.

247. Id.
248.

See supra Part I.A.

249. See Total Care Physicians, P.A. v. O'Hara, No. CIV.A.99C-11-201-JRS, 2002 WL
31667901, at *9 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 29, 2002).
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practice. 250 Even with this articulated rule, physicians may still be found
in breach of their non-solicitation agreements. 251 In this case, the
physician was found to be in violation of her non-solicitation clause
because her notification letter talked about a higher quality of care at her
new practice, thus breaking the third element of the rule. 2 52
Interestingly, although courts understand the physician's duty to
notify patients of their departure, 253 many courts find that if a physician
uses patient lists or records from their previous employer, that it would be
a breach in a non-solicitation clause. 254 It is believed that punishing
physicians when they attempt to notify patients may "deter physicians
from fulfilling ethical obligations, disrupt[s] continuity of care, and
potentially deprive[s] patients choice of providers." 255 This is harmful to
the public, 2 56 and courts should weigh these factors heavily when
enforcing non-solicitation clauses. 25 7 In the realm of telehealth, the
enforcement of non-solicitation clauses gets more complicated as patient
2 58
lists get longer and geographic territories get larger.
In Bloomington UrologicalAssociates, SC v. Scaglia, the court was
faced with the question of whether a physician answering patient phone
calls when he was present in the geographic area where his previous
employer restricted his practice of medicine would constitute a breach of
the restrictive covenant. 259 The physician had left his previous employer,
and in compliance with the restrictive covenant he had signed, started his
own medical practice outside of the restricted geographic location. 2 60
However, he lived within the area that was restricted by his previous
employer and he often took patient phone calls and faxes from his home
office.2 6 1 The previous employer enjoined the physician arguing that he
was breaching the covenant by practicing at his home, and thus within the
restricted geographic area. 2 62 On appeal, the court found that the
physician had a duty not to abandon his patients and enforcing the
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
Ch. May
255.

Id at *9-*10.
Id. at *10.
Id.
Id. at *6.
See id at *9; Dickinson Med. Grp., P.A. v Foote, No. 834-K, 1984 WL 8208, at *3 (Del.
10, 1984).
Clausen, supra note 129, at 113.

256. See id. at 132.
257. See infra PartIV.
258. See infra Part IV.B.
259. Bloomington Urological Assocs., SC v. Scaglia, 686 N.E.2d 389, 391 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
260. See id.
261. Id.
262. See id
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covenant would not allow him to speak with his patients just based on
where he was located. 26 3 Although this court did not use the word
"telehealth," the physician here was likely practicing a version of it. 26 4
This case highlights the difficulties in enforcing restrictive covenants
against physicians practicing telehealth when the issue at hand is
geographic scope and the duty not to abandon patients.
Non-compete agreements and non-solicitation clauses are often
analyzed similarly, 265 especially as they are both typically included in the
same employment contract. 2 66 Thus, many of the issues found with the
enforcement of non-compete agreements in the telehealth industry will
arise with non-solicitation agreements. 267
III.

STATUTORY AND JURISDICTIONAL DIFFERENCES IN THE
ENFORCEMENT OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

This part will look at the way that states have individually addressed
non-compete agreements and non-solicitation clauses. Many states have
enacted statutes and taken very different approaches as to how physician
restrictive covenants should be enforced, with some states prohibiting
them together. 268 These inconsistencies will cause issues for physicians
and employers in the healthcare industry as they practice telehealth. 269 A
federal statute will be recommended in an effort to create uniformity as
the telehealth industry continues to grow. 2 70
A. States with No Statutory ProvisionsRelating to Physician
Restrictive Covenants
The enforcement of physician non-competes varies drastically from
state-to-state, making the landscape even more confusing for
physicians. 27 1 While the majority of states allow non-competes, 2 72 these
states have a wide range of statutory laws and court made rules in

263. Id. at 394.
264. Seeid.
265. See supra Part II.
266. Clark, supra note 18.
267. See supra Part II.

268. See infra Part III.
269. See infra Part III.
270.
271.
272.

See infra Part IV.
See supra Part I.B.
See Beck, supra note 112.
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determining the enforceability. 2 73 On one end of the spectrum, New York
sees no distinction between the enforcement of physician non-competes
and non-competes in other employment fields. 274 Enforceability is
determined on a factual basis to determine if the non-compete is
reasonable as to time and geographic scope. 275 Most states follow some
variation of the reasonableness approach, 276 which was previously
discussed in depth. 277 This approach can further be broken into three
categories: (1) reasonableness with no heightened scrutiny; (2)
reasonableness with heightened scrutiny; and (3) the blue pencil rule that
allows courts to edit covenants to make them reasonable. 27 8 When there
is no heightened scrutiny, courts look at physician restrictive covenants
the same way that they look at all other professions. 279 Other courts have
heightened scrutiny which leads to a more in-depth look into the interests
of the physician and the public policy ramifications. 280 Lastly, the blue
pencil rule allows courts to modify restrictive covenants that would
otherwise be unenforceable to make them compliant and thus
enforceable. 28 1
B. States That ProhibitPhysicianRestrictive Covenants
On the other end of the spectrum, seven states have expressly banned
restrictive covenants as applied to physicians. 282
For example,
Massachusetts, 28 3 Delaware, 28 4 and Colorado 285 prohibit the enforcement

273. See id.
274. Marshall, supranote 130. Non-competes in New York "are enforceable as long as they are:
(1) necessary to protect the employer's legitimate interests; (2) do not impose an undue hardship on
the employee; (3) do not harm the public; and (4) are reasonable in time period and geographic scope."

Id.
275. Id.
276. Clausen, supranote 129, at 128.
277.
278.

See supraPart I1.
Clausen, supranote 129, at 128.

279. Id.
280. Id.
281. See id. at 135.
282.

See Mike Kreager, The Physician's Right in

§ 15.50(B)

To Buy Out a Covenant Not to

Compete in Texas, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 357, 370 (2009).
283. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112 § 12X (West 2020).

"Any contract...

with a

physician ... which includes any restriction of the right of such physician to practice medicine in any
geographic area for any period of time after the termination of. . . employment ... shall be void and
unenforceable." Id.

284. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2707 (West 2020).
285. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-113(3)(a).
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of restrictive covenants against physicians via statutes. 286 However, while
Delaware and Colorado do not enforce non-competes that limit a
physician's right to practice, they allow employers to contract terms for
the liquidated damages that may reasonably occur if the physician leaves
and begins competing with them. 28 7 More states have considered enacting
similar statutes and banning physician non-competes, or at least limiting
their enforcement. 288 The District of Columbia (hereinafter "D.C.") has
2 89
distinguished physician non-competes in an entirely different manner.
In the beginning of 2021, D.C. passed a bill that intends to render all non2 90
compete clauses void, except for those enforced against physicians.
These states exemplify the public policy concerns that surround physician
restrictive covenants by banning them all-together.
C. States with Unique Statutory andJudge Made Approachesfor
PhysicianRestrictive Covenants
Other states fall somewhere in the middle; they allow non-competes
against physicians but create extra protections for physicians and
patients. 29 1 Depending on the state, these added protections are done
2 92
either through the legislative process or through their court systems.
Utah, Wisconsin, and Idaho have all recently made it harder for employers
to enforce restrictive covenants against physicians. 293 For example, one
court found that restrictive covenants will only be enforced against
physicians when they are narrowly tailored restricting only the activity
294
necessary to protect the employer's interest's and nothing more.
Florida is an example of a state with added protections in the form of
statutory language. 2 95 Florida expressly states in its statute that "[t]he

286.

See supra notes 283-85.

287. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2707 (West 2020); see also COLO. REV. STAT.

§ 8-2-113(3)(a)

("[T]he payment of damages in an amount that is reasonably related to the injury suffered by reason
of termination of the agreement, are enforceable. Provisions of a covenant not to compete that require
the payment of damages upon termination of the agreement may include damages related to
competition.").
288. See Clark, supra note 18.
289. See District of Columbia is on the Verge of Implementing One of the Broadest NonCompetition Bans in the Country, NEWSTEX BLOGS (Jan. 16, 2021), Lexis.

290. See id.
291.

See e.g. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

§ 20-14p

(West 2020); see also FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 542.336 (West 2020); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-1-148 (West 2020).
292.

See Troutman, supra note 127.

293. See id.
294. See id.
295. FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 542.336.
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Legislature finds that such covenants restrict patient access to physicians,
increase costs, and are void and unenforceable," thus there needs to be
restrictions on physician non-compete agreements. 296 In most states and
jurisdictions, courts will use the rule of reason test in determining whether
the non-competes are reasonable as to time and geographic scope. 297
Determining the geographic scope of physician non-competes for
telehealth providers will be nearly impossible as the changes in interstate
practice could lead to an almost limitless area of practice. 298
Texas has taken a unique statutory approach in their enforcement of
While Texas permits physician nonphysician non-competes.299
competes, it expressly outlines four prerequisite requirements that must
be made in order to be enforced. 300 In order for a covenant not to compete
to be enforceable against a physician it must: (1) not deny access to patient
lists for patients that had been seen within one year of termination, allow
access to previous patient medical records upon authorization of the
patient, and the records be provided in the same format; (2) provide a
buyout option for the physician at a reasonable price; and (3) the covenant
must allow physicians to continue providing treatment to patients that are
in the course of an acute illness even after the termination of
employment. 30 1 Aspects of section 15.50(b) will be used later in this note
in drafting the potential federal statute. 302
Texas law makers drafted Tex. Bus. & Com. Ann. section 15.50(b)
with the protections of the public in mind. 30 3 Even if the non-compete.is
enforceable, physicians are still allowed to continue care for patients
needing acute care, which combats issues with disruption of care. 304
Texas is the only state that includes, and requires, a buyout option for
physicians in order for the non-compete to be enforceable. 30 5 The buyout
is either determined upon signing the contract or when the non-compete
becomes enforceable and will then be decided through an arbitrator. 306 A
physician who wishes to leave their employer can either make the choice
of being bound to the non-compete restrictions, or physicians can choose

296.

Id.

297.
298.
299.

Malloy, supra note 19 at 195.
See supra Part H.D.
See Kreager, supra note 282, at 361.
TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50(b) (West 2020).

300.
301. Id.
302.
303.

See infra Part IV.
See Kreager, supra note 282, at 415.

304. Id.
305. Id.
306. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1 5.50(b)(2) (West 2020).
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to enact the buyout clause and pay their employer to continue seeing their
past patients and practice in the geographic area they choose. 3 07 Thus,
Texas's approach in enforcing physician non-competes balances the
8
interests of the employer, the physician, and the public. 30 Including a
buyout requirement for physician non-competes for those practicing
30 9
telehealth would also help with balancing those same interests.
IV.

FEDERAL LEGISLATION TO CREATE UNIFORMITY AND
ALLOW FOR CONTINUED GROWTH IN TELEHEALTH

3 10
and
With the push for national uniformity in physician licensing
31
guidelines
creating
uniform telehealth regulations, 1 federal legislation
for the enforcement of restrictive covenants for physicians practicing
telehealth is the best way to create consistency. This will make it easier
for employers to draft non-compete agreements for physicians practicing
telehealth. 312 Instead of having to navigate the temporary physician
licensing regulations because of COVID-19 and the inconsistent
enforcement of physician non-competes, a federal statute will make the
requirements expressly clear. 3 13 Clearer requirements in turn could
reduce the number of court cases brought to determine the validity of a
restrictive covenant. 3 14 This would decrease litigation costs and increase
time for both employers and physicians, as this litigation is often lengthy
and costly. 3 15

A. ProposedFederal Statute
The general proposition in enforcing telehealth physician noncompetes and non-solicitation clauses is that they be viewed in the light
316
most favorable to pre-existing physician-patient relationships.
307. See Kraeger, supra note 282, at 363.
308. See generally id. (discussing the legislative history in enacting TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 15.50(b) and the intent Texas had in balancing public welfare, a physician's interest in moving
between employers, and the employer's interest in protecting its business).

309. Id.
310.

See supra notes 78-81.

311.
312.
313.

See supra notes 89-91.
See supra notes 89-91.
See infra Part W.A.

314. See generally Troutman, supra note 127 (discussing the costliness of restrictive covenant
litigation).
315. Id. (involving the judicial system in the enforcement of restrictive covenants is expensive
and having clearer restrictions would decrease the need to resolve the issues in court).

316.

See supra Part II.B. (discussing physician-patient relationships).
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Telehealth increases the number of patients that physicians can treat and
allows greater access to care.3 17 This is especially relevant in rural
geographic areas and for communities that are generally underserved.3 18
The practice of telehealth has the power to expand access to medical care
and allows patients to maintain close relationships with their providers. 3 19
The enforcement of restrictive covenants should not negate these public
health benefits. There are strong public policy reasons to not limit patient
access to the physicians of their choice and to protect patients' right to
maintain physician-patient relationships. 320 Thus, in order to enforce
these restrictive covenants, employers should have the burden of
supplying tangible evidence of the business interests that they are trying
to protect and that the restrictive covenant actually protects those
interests. 32 1 The proposed framework is a best effort to balance the
competing interests of healthcare employers, physicians, and patients. 322
The proposed federal statute is as follows.
ENFORCEMENTOF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS FOR PHYSICIANS
PRACTICING TELEHEALTH:
Once an employer makes an ample showing of its business interests, the
following requirements must be made to enforce a restrictive covenant
against a physician practicing telehealth:
(1) the employer is only restricting the activities that the specific
physician was conducting in the last year of employment;
(2-) the geographic scope restricted cannot be a blanket territory of the
business itself, rather it may be the geographic location of where the
specific physician was practicing;
(3) departing physicians must be able to continue treating patients
experiencing acute illness 323 until reasonably resolved (or be allowed to
assist in setting up follow up care);

317.

See INST. OF MED., supra note 43, at 15.

318.

Id. at 6.

319.
320.

See supraPart I.
See Clausen, supranote 129, at 132.

321.

See id at 130-31.

322.

See supraPart II.C.

323. Acute

(2012),
https://medicalSEGEN'S
MED.
DICTIONARY
Illness,
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Acute+Illness (defining acute illnesses as those which develop
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(4) the departing physician must be able to access the medical records
for the before mentioned patients, even after departure;
(5) the departing physicians must be able to inform patients of their
departure and assist prior patients in the referral process of finding a new
physician, but they may not encourage patients to follow them. If the
patient chooses to follow their physician to a new healthcare system, the
physician may not be penalized; and
(6) the time restricted cannot be longer than one year;
(7) employers must also include a buyout provision that would allow
physicians to pay a predetermined amount of money to be released from
the contract.

This is a high burden for employers to meet, but it is a best effort to
balance the competing interests of the employer, the physicians, the
patients, and the public health interests. 32 4 This high standard for
enforcement ensures that patients are not losing access to their physicians
due to non-compete and non-solicitation clauses, unless the employer has
5
legitimate business interests that need to be protected. 32 It also allows
for employers to continue using restrictive covenants, but makes sure that
they are reasonable. 326
If this proposed federal statute is enacted, it will preempt current state
statutes and judge made rules.3 27 The preemption doctrine comes from
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution which allows federal statutes to
preempt the conflicting state authority.3 28 Thus, preemption allows this
note's proposed federal legislation to override current state policies on the
enforcement of restrictive covenants for physicians practicing telehealth.

quickly, are often severe, but typically respond to treatment. Upon completing treatment, the patient
usually returns to their baseline health.).
324. See supra Part V.A.
325. See supra Part II.

326.
327.
Sept. 22,
328.

See infra Part I.B.
Preemption, CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/preemption (last visited
2021).
Id.
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B. Analysis of the ProposedFederalStatute and Why it is Better
than Other Propositions
This note's proposed statute respects employer's interest in
protecting its business investments by still allowing employers to require
physicians to enter into restrictive covenants. 329 However, the statute
builds in protections for physicians and patients, as it requires employers
to prove that the restrictive covenant is actually doing what it was intended
to do. 3 30 The statute does this by narrowly tailoring the terms of restrictive
covenants and prevents employers from restricting large territories and
from having long restrictions. 33 1 As physicians practicing telehealth
practice in larger and larger territories, requiring employers to specifically
outline the geographic boundaries of their patients limits employers from
implementing over-broad restrictions. 332 The buyout provision also gives
physicians the ability to not be restricted at all if they so choose, and it
helps financially compensate employers for some of the money they might
have invested into training and developing the physician. 3
This proposed statute also does its best in protecting patients,
especially those in the course of acute treatment. This prevents the
patient-physician relationship from being interrupted suddenly and allows
a physician to finish treatment. Physicians are able to fulfill their legal
and ethical duties to inform patients of their departure without
punishment. However, it prevents them from encouraging their patients
to follow them, but if patients choose to do some on their own accord, the
patient will not be prevented, nor the physician punished. Lastly, the
proposed federal statutes main purpose is to create uniformity across the
United States for all physicians and healthcare provides as they enter into
restrictive covenants. 334
Other scholars have offered different solutions for regulating
physician restrictive covenants.3 3 5 One scholar argues that states should

329. See supra Part W.A.
330. See supra Part IV.A.
331. See supra Part W.A.
332. See Megna, supranote 152, at 1022.
333. See supra notes 299-306 and accompanying text discussing the buyout provisions of the
Texas statute.
334. See generally CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-14p (West 2020); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.336

(West 2020); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-1-148 (West 2020) (displaying the nonuniformity of state
statutes).
335. See generally Clausen, supra note 129; Megna, supra note 152. Both authors have
commentated on the irregularities of the enforcement of physician restrictive covenants and have
offered solutions.
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all enact the same statute, with the main premise being that all physician
restrictive covenants be presumed void and unenforceable unless the
employer meets the burden of proving business interests. 33 6 Another
argued that the enforceability of physician restrictive covenants be
regulated on a nationwide basis by drafting a model statute and
encouraging states to adopt it on their own accords. 337 Both of these
proposals fail in reaching their intended purpose of creating uniformity.
Allowing states the option to opt-in, and merely encourage them to adopt
a model statute, will likely still lead to the same inconsistency issues that
currently exist. 338 Some states may adopt the model statutes, others may
adopt versions of the statutes, while others may ignore them all
together. 33 9 States may update the statutory analysis used in enforcing
physician restrictive covenants, however, there is no guarantee that all
states will and there will still be inconsistencies. Thus, the best way to
ensure a consistent enforcement of restrictive covenants for physicians
practicing telehealth is for federal action and the adoption of this note's
proposed federal statute. This is especially important as the push for
federal medical licensing increases.3 40
CONCLUSION

Congress should enact this note's proposed federal statute to create
uniformity in the enforcement of restrictive covenants for physicians
practicing telehealth. Physician restrictive covenants are enforced in
drastically different ways varying from state to state, and jurisdiction to
With some states prohibiting physician restrictive
jurisdiction. 34 1
covenants in their entirety, 342 others carving out exceptions, 34 3 and others
treating physician restrictive covenants no different than other
industries, 344 there is great discrepancy in the enforcement.
These inconsistencies will become more prevalent as physicians
continue to increase their usage of telehealth services, and as state
licensure regulations are relaxed. 345 There is forward movement towards
336. See Megna, supra note 152, at 1031-32.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.

See Clausen, supra note 129, at 149-52.
See supra Part 1H.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part I.B.2.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part hI.A.
See supraPartH.
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a uniform physician licensing scheme and an increase in interstate medical
practice. 34 6 Interstate practice continues to increase with the explosion of
the telehealth market. 347 The current state of enforcing physician
restrictive covenants is inadequate to deal with the telehealth industry. 348
The reasonableness test used by many courts in determining
enforceability of restrictive covenants does not work in the telehealth
industry as geographic scopes of practice increase. 349 The unique
interests in the telehealth industry (employers, physicians, patients, and
public health) all have different interests that need to be balanced. 350
In order to balance these opposing interests and create uniformity
across the country as other aspects of the medical field move into the
federal statutory spotlight, Congress should pass this note's proposed
statute.
Alexia Willis*
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See supra notes 78-81.
See supra Part H.A.
See supra Part 111.
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See supra Part II.
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See supra Part II.C.
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